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HE cases chosen for review in this Survey will not change the face
of Texas jurisprudence. In fact, some of them are relatively insig-




1. Deere v. Ingram1
This case involved a claimed oral partnership (joint venture, actually2)
and allegations of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and ulti-
mate termination of a partnership at will triggered by the withdrawal of a
partner.3
Ingram wanted to establish a pain-management clinic, but, as a psy-
chologist, he needed a medical doctor to be the clinic's medical director.
Dr. Deere fit that bill, so the parties made an oral arrangement to share
revenues of the clinic. About fifteen months later, Ingram presented a
written agreement to Deere, entitled "Physician's Contractual Employ-
ment Agreement," stipulating that Ingram was the sole owner of the pain
clinic. Deere refused to acknowledge that he was only an employee, and
so he left, apparently never to return.
Deere did not file suit until almost three years later, asking for
$2,525,437.00 in damages (his share of revenues) for the period between
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas (with honors). At-
torney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.S., The University of Texas; M./B.A., University of Houston; J.D., University of
Houston (magna cum laude). Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Houston,
Texas.
1. 198 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
2. The common distinction is that a joint venture is a general partnership for a lim-
ited purpose, but Texas common law has grafted an additional requirement. See, e.g.,
Steven A. Waters, Partnerships, 55 SMU L. REV. 1271, 1274-75 (2002); see also, TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 2.02(a) (Vernon 2006) (including "joint venture" in defini-
tion of "partnership").
3. There also was some procedural fun including a jury verdict, entry of a Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV") by the original trial judge, recusal by that original
trial judge, and entry by the successor trial judge of a second JNOV, among other things.
Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 99.
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the time he left through trial and another $2,500,000.00 for his share of
revenues after the trial. The jury found that the parties had an oral joint
venture, that Ingram both owed and breached fiduciary duties to Deere,
and that Ingram breached the oral joint venture agreement. Conse-
quently, the jury awarded Deere damages and attorney's fees.4
The original trial judge, Evans, responded to Ingram's Motion for a
JNOV by deleting the $2,500,000.00 post-trial award and reducing the at-
torney's fees. A second trial judge, Hartman, granted Ingram's second
motion for a JNOV and ordered that Deere take nothing from Ingram.5
Deere appealed.6
Ingram made two relevant assertions in his second motion for JNOV:
(1) that the trial court improperly awarded $2,525,437.00 because future
damages are not recoverable in a terminated partnership at will7; and (2)
that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Ingram owed Deere fiduci-
ary duties because a partnership did not create a fiduciary relationship.8
Although he apparently tried to force an after-the-fact employment re-
lationship on Deere, Ingram did not argue that there was not an oral
partnership. Instead, he argued that he and Deere had created a partner-
ship at will 9 that terminated10 in March 1999 when Deere refused to sign
the employment agreement (stating that Ingram was the sole owner of
the clinic).1
The first order of business was for the Dallas Court of Appeals to de-
termine whether the Texas Revised Partnership Act1 2 ("TRPA") applied.
After considering the parties' arguments and citing recent case law sup-
porting the TRPA's application to an oral partnership, 13 the court of ap-
4. Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 99.
5. As the case makes clear, Hartman had the disadvantage of not having been the
presiding judge at trial, nor was he provided a record from which to work. His original
decision was to grant a new trial, but after Deere objected to that, he opted for the JNOV
in favor of Ingram. Id. at 98-99.
6. Id. at 99-100.
7. The opinion included "oral" before "partnership," but that seems irrelevant to the
issue. Also, recall that at this stage, Ingram already had one JNOV in his favor, that the
$2,500,000 of post-trial damages were not allowed. Id.
8. Id. at 100. More on this later, but in modern jurisprudence and with the possible
exception of trusts, partnerships have been the most fertile location of fiduciary duties.
9. A partnership at will relationship can be terminated by the affirmative action of
either partner at any time, generally without consequences.
10. Over the years, terms that describe a partnership's change of status have caused
much confusion. The former scheme was that "dissolution" was followed by "winding up"
that was followed by "termination" of the partnership's existence. Now, the scheme in
Texas is "withdrawal" of a partner that may or may not be "an event requiring a winding
up" that leads to a "termination" of the existence of the partnership Lawyers, courts, and
commentators frequently default to "termination," when that is not correct, or they use
"dissolution" to mean the end of the partnership. Fortunately, the term "dissolution" was
not included in the Texas Revised Partnership Act, mainly because of this confusion. TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 1.01 (Vernon 2006).
11. Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 100-01.
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, 1.01-11.05 (Vernon 2006) ("TRPA").
13. Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 101 (citing Coleman v. Coleman, 170 S.W. 3d 231(Tex.
App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied)). Also, as the court of appeals noted, TRPA section
1.01(12) states that a partnership can be written or oral. Id.
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peals correctly concluded that the TRPA did apply, rejecting Ingram's
argument that a partnership "at will" is governed by the common law and
not by a statute. 14
After reviewing TRPA provisions addressing both partner withdrawal
and the events that trigger the "winding-up" process, the court of appeals
concluded that none applied because Deere had not withdrawn. 15 In
reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals found that the evidence,
while disputed, was sufficient to support the jury's award of damages to
Deere (equal to his share of net revenues) which the court of appeals
equated to a jury finding that the partnership had, in fact, continued for
that time.' 6
The court of appeals next considered whether Ingram owed or
breached any fiduciary duties to Deere. Given the very long history of
fiduciary duties in the partnership context, and the fact that the court of
appeals acknowledged that fiduciary duties arise both from formal rela-
tionships (it cited trustee-beneficiary and attorney-client) and informal
relationships of trust and confidence, it is remarkable that the court of
appeals did not discuss, or even allude to, any of that long history.' 7 A
review of the brief submitted by Deere's lawyers confirms that they com-
petently addressed the issue.18 It is a mystery, then, that the court of
appeals, quick to acknowledge that fiduciary duties arise from particular
relationships, did not discuss the issue in the context of the parties' rela-
tionship as partners.' 9 Indeed, using only the "trust and confidence/spe-
cial relationship" analysis, the court of appeals concluded that "the
record contains no evidence of a fiduciary relationship between Deere
14. Id.
15. Id. at 101-02. The court of appeals also rejected Ingram's notions that (i) Deere's
walkout was equivalent to a statutory "notice of an express will to withdraw" (TRPA
§ 6.01(b)( 1)), or (ii) that an ill-conceived "notice of the partner's expulsion" given by
Ingram to Deere served as an event of withdrawal by Deere because TRPA § 6.01 requires
that an expulsion be pursuant to the partnership agreement. TRPA §6.01(b)( 3). There
was no such predicate here. Id. at 101-02. The court's discussion of the TRPA and its
application did not apply because the court of appeals concluded that there was no
withdrawal.
16. One cannot tell from the opinion exactly what happened, but given that Deere's
status as a medical doctor was crucial to the clinic's ability to lawfully operate, it would
have been interesting to know whether he was replaced with another medical doctor,
whether that replacement was promised ownership, etc.
17. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
18. Brief of Appellant at 31-33, Deere v. Ingram, 198 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2006, no pet.) (No. 05-05-0063).
19. There is a keen irony in this to this author, who has been involved with State Bar
committees' efforts to achieve just that result: that partners, unlike trustees, do not owe
the same fiduciary duty to one another that a trustee owes to its beneficiary. TRPA section
4.04 says just that, and the Bar comments explain the rationale (which includes that, unlike
trustees, partners are owners dealing with their own interests, even if they might also be
responsible for that of their partners). Courts have been slow to accept this, which Deere's
counsel's brief discusses, citing the Texas Supreme Court decision in M. R. Champion, Inc.
v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1995), criticized by this author in this publication. Steven




2. Zinda v. McCann Street, Ltd.21
Zinda was a limited partner in a limited partnership that owned and
leased property to Zinda for a restaurant. 22 Zinda's gambling and op-
tions-trading losses led him to borrow money from his partners and
pledge his limited partner's interest as collateral. Eventually, the lending
partners foreclosed his ownership,23 and Zinda brought claims of breach
of fiduciary duty against the other limited partners.24
Citing the proposition that "[f]iduciary duties arise as a matter of law in
certain formal relationships, including attorney-client, partnership and
trustee relationships," 25 the Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that
the other limited partners owed fiduciary duties to Zinda,26 that those
fiduciary duties included "a strict duty of good faith and candor, ' 27 and
that partners have a duty to one another to make full disclosure regarding
matters affecting the partnership. 28 With respect to the disclosure issue,
the court of appeals cited TRPA section 4.04 but did not acknowledge
that the partnership was a limited partnership with one general partner.
The court of appeals also failed to acknowledge that TRPA section 4.04 is
from the "general partnership statute,"29 or cite the "linkage" provision
of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act 30 ("TRLPA"), section
13.03(b)( 2)( A), which provides that, to the extent not inconsistent with
20. 198 S.W.3d 96 at 103. It would have been a beautiful thing if the court had cited to
TRPA section 4.04, and said that there was no longer a fiduciary relationship, as such,
based on the authority of that section. Nothing in the opinion suggested that it would have
mattered given the finding on withdrawal; perhaps the fiduciary claim was a "backup plan"
that turned out not to be needed.
21. 178 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
22. Id. at 887. Zinda had been the sole owner and operator of the restaurant at an
earlier time; after it burned down, the partnership was formed to acquire the land from
Zinda. It borrowed money to rebuild the restaurant, and then leased the restaurant prop-
erty to Zinda for $7,500 per month for twenty years. Id.
23. Zinda complained that the partnership did not do this properly because the vehicle
used was a deed of trust, which creates liens on real property, while a partnership interest
is personal property. Zinda was right about those things, but a deed of trust document also
often creates a security interest in personal property, which is apparently what the court
relied on in upholding the foreclosure. Id. at 894.
24. Id. at 889-90. Ironically, it is Zinda whom the opinion paints as clearly the prob-
lem actor. Zinda claimed that the other partners withheld relevant partnership informa-
tion from him, contrary to their fiduciary duties, when they were trying to decide what to
do about his conduct. See id. at 890-91.
25. Id. at 890. But see Deere v. Ingram, 198 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no
pet.).
26. Zinda, 178 S.W.3d at 890. The partners might have pursued the argument that
limited partners do not, as such, owe fiduciary duties; apparently, there was no need to do
that in view of the overwhelming evidence otherwise in their favor. In fact, it is not obvi-
ous that limited partners owe fiduciary duties, as such, at least if they do not participate in
control of the partnership's business.
27. Id. at 891.
28. Id. at 890.
29. Id.
30. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
1220 [Vol. 60
Partnerships
the TRLPA, the TRPA applies to the TRLPA.31
B. JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
1. Dunnagan v. Watson 32
A dispute arose between two limited partners of a limited partnership
formed among three individuals, as limited partners, and a corporation
organized and owned by them, as the general partner, to own a horse-
racing facility. Dunnagan owned fifty percent (including his part of the
general partner corporation) while Watson and Lawley shared the re-
maining half. Lawley eventually sold both his limited partner's interest
and his shares in the corporate general partner, leaving Dunnagan and
Watson as partners with approximately sixty percent and forty percent
shares, respectively. 33
Although the issue in the case-whether there was sufficient evidence
to support a jury finding-dilutes the importance of the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals' conclusion, the judicial dissolution element warrants cover-
age. The jury found, and the court of appeals agreed, that there was evi-
dence to support the finding that Dunnagan's conduct implicated TRLPA
section 8.02(2), which permits a court to dissolve a limited partnership if
the court finds that "another partner has engaged in conduct relating to
the limited partnership business that makes it not reasonably practicable
to carry on the business in limited partnership with that partner. '34
The partnership was organized to acquire a horse-racetrack facility,
which it did, and seek a horse racing license, which was expected to take
between three to six months. 35 In the meantime, two of the three initial
partners wanted the partnership to operate an on-site restaurant; the
third, Dunnagan, did not. After much debate, the parties agreed that
Watson and Lawley would operate the restaurant, at their expense, and
they did so. The only operations conducted by the partnership itself re-
lated to the facility's "backside," which consisted of the stable area and
racetrack. 36 After sixteen months, Watson and Lawley also took on the
operation of the backside, with the same understanding that it was for
their, not the partnership's, account. 37 When the partnership failed to
acquire a racing license (the bad news came a couple of months after
Watson and Lawley assumed operation of the backside), the parties' rela-
tionship deteriorated: Watson asked the court for a judicial dissolution
31. § 13.03(b)( 2)( A).
32. 204 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
33. Id. at 34-35.
34. Id. at 38.
35. The effort to acquire the racing license took much longer than expected and was
unsuccessful, which appears to have contributed, if not led, to the difficulties between Dun-
nagan and Watson.
36. Even without a license that permitted horse racing, horses could be stabled there
and trained and exercised on the racetrack, producing some revenue for the partnership.
But revenues do not equal profits.
37. Dunnagan, 204 S.W.3d at 35-36.
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under TRLPA section 8.02(2); Dunnagan fought that and brought a claim
of his own for breach of fiduciary duty by Watson. One interesting aspect
of the opinion is the discussion of Watson's fiduciary duty, remembering
the roles he undertook as a limited partner in the partnership, as an of-
ficer of the corporate general partner,38 and as the operator of an on-site
restaurant for his own account. The court of appeals discussing fiduciary
duties arising from particular formal relationships, including partners in a
partnership, 39 noted that fiduciary duties apply "to any person who occu-
pies a position of peculiar confidence towards another," 40 and then spe-
cifically mentioned the fiduciary relationship between a corporate officer
or director and the corporation.4 1
Dismissing Dunnagan's claim that Watson could not seek a judicial dis-
solution because Watson did not have "clean hands," 42 the jury found
that Dunnagan's actions contributed to the impracticality of the partner-
ship's continuation.4 3 The partners, according to the court of appeals,
were frustrated and exhausted by "the seemingly endless disagreements
and discontent between Dunnagan and Watson. '44 Consequently, Wat-
son successfully obtained a judicial dissolution of the partnership, over
Dunnagan's objection. Surely, the case does not stand for the proposition
that a partner who wants a judicial dissolution-knowing that the other
partner does not-need only work to create, or at least foster, dishar-
mony to "set up" that result. It is good to remember the procedural pos-
ture of this case-the appellate court worked hard, following existing
procedural rules and precedent, to find support for the jury's findings.4 5
Furthermore, the court of appeals also found support in the record for
the jury's finding that Watson had breached fiduciary duties owed to the
limited partnership. 4 6
38. See id. at 46-47.
39. Dunnagan, 204 S.W.3d at 46. But see Deere v. Ingram, 198 S.W.3d 96 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
40. Dunnagan, 204 S.W.3d at 46.
41. Id. Apparently, the trial court's charge to the jury mentioned both the trust/confi-
dence relationship and, in much greater detail, the fiduciary duty owed by an officer or
director. And the trial court's charge spoke in terms of fiduciary duties owed by the corpo-
rate officer (of the general partner) directly to the limited partnership. Id.
42. The basis was the conduct that resulted in the finding that Watson breached fiduci-
ary duties, which included committing to obligations in the partnership name during the
time that he was running the restaurant and backside for his own account. Id.
43. Id. at 41, 44.
44. Id. at 44. It is hard to know what all of this means. The jury found, and the court
of appeals sustained, that Watson breached fiduciary duties and that Dunnagan did not.
Yet, it was Dunnagan's actions that were found to support the judicial dissolution of the
partnership. From the opinion, those actions included complaining that, after the applica-
tion to acquire a racing license was denied, Watson did not want to pay rent to use the
facilities for operating the restaurant and, generally, just disagreeing about what course the
partnership should take without the racing license. Id. at 43.
45. The court of appeals also stated that Dunnagan did not demonstrate the harm to
him of a judicial dissolution; he merely stated that he wanted to continue operations for
five years to make a profit. Id. at 41-42.
46. Again, the number of hats worn by Watson make it difficult to say with conviction
which hat sunk the boat. The headnotes of the reporter suggest that it was a limited part-
ner who owed duties to the partnership in that capacity, but the opinion itself is much less
[Vol. 601222
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2. Akuna Matata Investments v. Texas NOM Limited Partnership47
After prevailing in its state court suit in a case reported in last year's
Survey,48 plaintiff brought this-federal action to dissolve and terminate
the partnership and to divide the partnership assets. 49 The real issue in
the case was a procedural one: the res judicata effect of the state court
case on plaintiff's ability to sustain this federal action.50 But cases that
involve a judicial dissolution request are rare enough to justify coverage
of this one.
Hot on the heels of collecting on its state court victory, plaintiff filed
suit in federal court seeking dissolution of the partnership and partition
of the partnership property. 51 Defendants asserted that plaintiff's claims
had been litigated in the state courts, and thus were barred by res judi-
cata. Plaintiff countered that the dissolution request was a separate claim
based on defendants' "unreasonable conduct" that made it impractical to
continue with the partnership. 52
Following established principles, the district court looked to Texas law,
where the judgment in the prior case was rendered, to analyze the res
judicata claim. 53 Of the three elements that must be established to sus-
tain the res judicata claim, the one at issue here was that the second ac-
tion be based on the same claims as the first action, or on claims that
should previously have been raised.54 Texas employs the "transactional
approach" in determining the similarity and the barring effect of a liti-
gated claim. 55 Under this approach, a claim is barred if the claim "arises
out of the same subject matter of a previous suit and which through the
exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit."'5 6
The district court found that the claims arose from different facts: the
first action, in state court, was to determine the existence of the partner-
ship and any resulting breaches of duty if that existence was established;5 7
here, the claim arose out of the tense business relationship existing be-
tween the parties.58 But the state court litigation did not involve dissolu-
tion and termination of the partnership. Consequently, the district court
clear on that. Yes, that person was a limited partner, but it is not clear that he was acting as
such when his conduct resulted in breach of a duty. In any case, he apparently was an
officer but not a gentleman.
47. Akuna Matata Invs. v. Tex. NOM Ltd. P'ship, No. SA-05-CV-1053-RF, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 76788 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006).
48. Steven A. Waters & Angela Lilly, Partnerships, 59 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1473-76
(2006).
49. Akuna, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76788, at *5.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *5-6.
53. Id. at *11.
54. Id. at *12. The other two are (i) prior final judgment on the merits, and (ii) iden-
tity of parties, both undisputed here. Id.
55. Id. at *13.
56. Id. (citing Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631, 635 (Tex. 1992)).
57. Id. at 16.
58. Id. at 15. That, alone, was sufficient to deny defendants' motion for summary
judgment, according to the district court. Id.
2007] 1223
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found that the state court had not disposed of that claim, and that plain-
tiff's claim for dissolution was a separate action that did not arise from
the previously litigated claim. 59
When a partnership is between two people who no longer get along
and one party recovers, it is difficult to imagine the survival of that busi-
ness relationship, given that it is one usually built on trust and often in-
volving a close working environment. So, why do we not see more of
these judicial dissolution cases? Perhaps, the parties simply agree to dis-
continue as partners after their initial battle.
C. SPOUSAL JOINDER-DOES IT WORK?
1. In re Kirby Highland Lakes Surgery Center60
For Texas partnerships with natural person partners, it is common to
include in the partnership agreement a joinder to be signed by the non-
partner spouse to ensure that the spouse's community property interest in
the partnership interest of the partner-spouse is governed by the partner-
ship agreement. Though the drafter certainly has reasonable expecta-
tions that such a joinder works, there is nothing like a court test. This
case stands for the proposition that they can work.
Dr. Kirby and his spouse, Helen Kirby, operated an outpatient surgical
center. They were approached by other doctors who wanted to buy the
outpatient center and related assets, and become partners with Dr. Kirby.
The two key agreements were a purchase and sale agreement ("PSA")
and a partnership agreement. Importantly, the partnership agreement
was attached to the PSA as an exhibit, and the two documents were to be
signed concurrently as part of the sale of the outpatient center to the
partnership. Helen was not a partner, but she signed a "Joinder of
Spouses" addendum that purported to govern any community property
interest that she might have in her husband's partnership interest.61 The
partnership agreement, but not the PSA, contained an arbitration clause
for the resolution of disputes arising under or "related to" the agree-
ment.62 Under the PSA, the Kirbys sold, and financed with seller-financ-
ing, the outpatient center's real estate and related equipment.
After the partnership discontinued payments required by the PSA to
be made to the Kirbys for the acquired assets,63 the Kirbys filed suit in
state district court for breach of the PSA.64 The district court denied the
partnership's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the dispute was
governed by the PSA, not the partnership agreement, and that Helen was
not bound by the arbitration clause. The partnership appealed, arguing
59. Id. at 19.
60. In re Kirby Highland Lakes Surgery Ctr., 183 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006,
no pet.).
61. Id. at 893.
62. Id.
63. The partnership invoked a concern that the payments violated federal anti-kick-
back laws.
64. 183 S.W.3d at 894.
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that the partnership agreement was effectively incorporated into the PSA
or, alternatively, that the dispute arose under or was related to the part-
nership agreement. Therefore, they argued, the arbitration clause con-
trolled, and Helen was bound to the arbitration clause via the joinder that
she signed.65
Anyone interested in the arbitration issues, which included whether
state or federal law applied, 66 should consult the case. On the issue of
whether the joinder was effective to bind the non-partner spouse to the
arbitration clause, the Austin Court of Appeals found that it did bind her;
Helen's submission of her community property interest to the provisions
of the partnership agreement included the arbitration clause.67
D. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
1. Allodial Limited Partnership v. Susan Barilich, P.C.68
While a botched effort to effect service of process and the conse-
quences to a default judgment ordinarily would not be sufficiently inter-
esting to warrant coverage here, an occasional reminder that reading and
complying with statutes and the rules of civil procedure (and stating eve-
rything clearly in one's pleadings to the court!) is a good thing.
Law Firm sued Limited Partnership for unpaid legal fees and obtained
a summary judgment. Thinking that it was following the process spelled
out in the TRLPA, Law Firm served Limited Partnership through the
Texas Secretary of State, alleging that, although Limited Partnership's
principal place of business was in Dallas County, Texas, it did not have a
registered agent for service of process in Texas and thus could be served
with process through the Office of the Texas Secretary of State.69 The
Secretary of State's notice was returned as undeliverable, Limited Part-
nership did not participate in the trial, and a default judgment was en-
tered in favor of Law Firm. Limited Partnership appealed, claiming that
the lower court did not have personal jurisdiction over it.70
Limited Partnership contended that the trial court lacked personal ju-
risdiction because Law Firm did not strictly comply with the statutory
65. Id. at 894.
66. State law governed whether an arbitration agreement was formed, and the Federal
Arbitration Act governed otherwise, including whether the "related to" language in the
arbitration clause, when taken with the close nexus of the PSA and the partnership agree-
ment, was enough for the arbitration clause in the partnership agreement to govern a dis-
pute under the PSA. Id. at 895-96 (discussing requirements to compel arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act).
67. Id. at 903.
68. 184 S.W.3d 405 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
69. The process is different under TRLPA for domestic and foreign limited partner-
ships. In either case, under the right circumstances and as a substitute for direct service,
service can be made on the Texas Secretary of State. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a
§ 9.10 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (domestic and foreign respectively). Here, notice was
served on the Texas Secretary of State, which then sent notice by registered mail, return
receipt requested, to Limited Partnership's Las Vegas, Nevada home office. Allodial, 184
S.W.3d at 407.
70. Allodial, 184 S.W.3d at 407.
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requirements of TRLPA section 1.08, which governs service by the Secre-
tary of State, by failing to exercise the required reasonable diligence in
attempting to serve Limited Partnership before effecting service via the
Texas Secretary of State. 71 Law Firm countered that section 1.08 gov-
erned substituted service only for domestic limited partnerships and that
its request for service of process on Limited Partnership through the
Texas Secretary of State was proper under both section 9.10 of the
TRLPA, which applied to foreign limited partnerships, and section 17.044
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
72
In beginning its review of the lower court's summary judgment, the
Dallas Court of Appeals noted that it could rely only on the record for
jurisdictional facts. Unlike other procedural contexts, where indulging in-
ferences and presumptions is required, here the court of appeals was
barred from making inferences, and it was the plaintiff's burden to allege
sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the defendant within the statutory
provisions relied on for service. 73 The court of appeals noted that Law
Firm's pleadings alleged only that Limited Partnership was a limited part-
nership, and made no direct assertion that Limited Partnership was a for-
eign or domestic limited partnership. 74 Because Law Firm relied on the
Secretary of State for service, the record was required to show that (1)
Limited Partnership was amenable to service in this manner, and (2) Lim-
ited Partnership was served in the manner required by statute.75 Because
the pleadings were insufficient to determine the limited partnership's sta-
tus as domestic or foreign, the court of appeals looked at both cited
TRLPA sections.76
First, the court of appeals reviewed the requirements for service on a
domestic limited partnership under the TRLPA. The court of appeals
stated that although section 1.08 governs service of process on domestic
limited partnerships that have not appointed a registered Texas agent, a
plaintiff must first exercise reasonable diligence in locating and serving a
general partner before relying on the Secretary of State for service.77 The
record here contained no such showing. 78 Plaintiff did not comply with
section 1.08 (if it even applied, and it should not have on the full facts). 79
71. Id. at 408.
72. Id. Section 9.10 of the TRLPA concerns service on foreign limited partnerships,
and Section 17.044 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code concerns substituted
service on nonresidents.
73. Id. at 407-08. This was a "restricted appeal," which is a direct attack on the trial
court's judgment, one prerequisite of which is that the error must be apparent on the face
of the trial court record. Id.
74. Id. at 408. The court of appeals acknowledged that both parties agreed that Lim-
ited Partnership was a foreign limited partnership; however, in this context, the court of
appeals was obliged to look solely to the record available to the trial court at the time of
the default judgment. Id. at 408 n.1.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 408-09.




The court of appeals listed the four instances in which section 9.10 of
the TRLPA applies to service of process on a foreign limited partnership:
(1) no registered agent in Texas; (2) even with reasonable due diligence,
the registered agent could not be found at the registered office; (3) the
limited partnership's registration was cancelled; or (4) the limited part-
nership transacted business in this state without registering as required
under TRLPA 9.10(b). 80 Here, it was not the failure to comply with sec-
tion 9.10,81 but, rather, the incomplete record 82 that did not allow the
court to apply section 9.10.83 Therefore, Law Firm failed to demonstrate
that section 9.10 applied to the facts in the record.8 4
The lessons for the day from this case are to read the statute, to comply
with the statute, and to clearly connect the facts of your case to the
statute.
E. REDEMPTION OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
1. Coleman v. Coleman85
When a partner of a Texas general partnership dies, and there is not a
written partnership agreement to determine what happens, the TRPA is
supposed to fill the void. How it does that is not always crystal clear.
And when there is enough money involved.., well, that is why the courts
are in business.
Robert Coleman and his brother Max Coleman were equal partners in
a business, Coleman Properties. After Robert died, Max continued oper-
ating the business and sending Robert's salary to his widow, Debbie
Coleman, and paying certain expenses for her. Debbie sought to be paid
the value of Robert's partnership interest, insisting that the business be
wound up, and the proceeds distributed. Max continued operating the
business and changed the name to Coleman Logistics. Thereafter, Deb-
bie brought suit against Max seeking the redemption value of Robert's
partnership interest. 86 The trial court ruled in favor of Debbie. 87
On appeal, Max first argued that, as a transferee,8 8 Debbie was not
80. Id.
81. It was complied with because Limited Partnership did not have a registered agent
in Texas, triggering the application of clause (1).
82. Law Firm's petition asserted that Limited Partnership could be served at its home-
principal office in Las Vegas, Nevada, but did not allege that Limited Partnership was a
foreign limited partnership formed in Nevada. Allodial, 184 S.W.3d at 409.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. 170 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
86. Id. at 235.
87. Id. Specifically, the trial court held: (1) Max failed to wind up the business after
Debbie's request to do so; (2) Debbie was entitled to the redemption price of Robert's
interest; and (3) Max failed to tender the redemption price. The trial court reduced the
redemption price by fifteen percent for "lack of control," i.e., Debbie was not a partner but
a transferee. Id.
88. Indeed, and as the court of appeals noted, under TRPA section 5.04(b), a deceased
partner's surviving spouse is treated for purposes of the TRPA as the transferee of the
deceased partner's interest in the partnership. Id. at 237.
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entitled to the redemption price by statute, but instead only to the bal-
ance in Robert's capital account at the time of his death. 89 The parties
agreed that Coleman Properties was an oral partnership at will with no
written agreement to guide what should happen when there was a with-
drawal of a partner. 90 As noted above in the discussion of the Allodial
case, the statute (here, the TRPA) fills in the gaps left by the parties, and,
in the case of an oral partnership, it effectively becomes the agreement. 91
The Dallas Court of Appeals said that the TRPA provides two methods
for a withdrawn partner 92 to be paid the value of its partnership interest:
(1) via receiving its share from a distribution of assets after the partner-
ship's business is wound up; or (2) if the business continues, via a redemp-
tion of its interest by the partnership under TRPA section 7.01. 93
Section 8.01, which spells out the various events that require a partner-
ship to be wound up, provides that a wind-up request from a partner of a
partnership at will is one such event. 94 After the partnership is wound
up, creditors are paid and accounts among the partners are settled, and
any resulting profits or losses are credited or charged to the partners'
capital accounts.95 But if the business is continued, then TRPA section
7.01 comes into play, requiring the partnership to buy the withdrawn
partner's interest at a redemption price that equals the fair market value
on the date of withdrawal. 96
Max argued that TRPA section 7.01(a) only entitled partners to be paid
the redemption price, which excluded Debbie, a mere transferee. Max
further asserted that section 7.01(n) was the only provision that provided
for a transferee to be able to have her interest redeemed, but that section
7.01(n) did not apply to partnerships at will. Therefore, Max concluded
that Debbie, at most, was entitled to any "positive balance" in Robert's
capital account under section 8.06(b)'s winding-up provisions.97 This ar-
gument was easy for the court of appeals to reject-Robert failed to liqui-
date the business ("wind up"), then sought to force a twisted
interpretation of a winding-up provision on the other party. The court of
appeals agreed that, on its face, TRPA section 7.01(n) does not apply to
partnerships at will.98 However, the court of appeals found that the over-
89. Id. at 235.
90. Id. at 236. "Event of withdrawal" does not always include the affirmative conduct
that "withdrawal" suggests. The death of a partner is an event of withdrawal of that part-
ner under TRPA section 6.01(b)( 7)( A). Id. at 237.
91. See id. at 236.
92. Again, a deceased partner is a withdrawn partner. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b § 6.01(b)( 7)( A) (Vernon 2006) ("TRPA").
93. Id. at 236. TRPA § 7.01(a) requires a redemption on the occurrence of an event of
withdrawal, if an event requiring a winding up does not occur within sixty days after the
withdrawal. TRPA § 7.01(a).
94. TRPA § 8.01(g). It also provides that a majority-in-interest of the other partners
may elect to continue the partnership and that continuation without settlement or liquida-
tion is considered to be such an election. Id.
95. TRPA § 8.06(a)-( b).
96. TRPA § 7.01(a); 170 S.W.3d at 237.
97. 170 S.W.3d at 237.
98. Id. at 238.
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all structure of the TRPA intended that the value of a partnership interest
be recoverable in one of the two ways discussed above. 99 Consequently,
because Max did not wind up the partnership, the court of appeals found
that the remaining option must apply (redemption). 10 0 Max was required
to buy out Robert's partnership interest at the redemption value at the
time of his death. 1° 1
III. LIMITED LIABILITY CASES
A. NATURE OF LLC INTEREST
1. In re Delta Starr Broadcasting'0 2
While we ordinarily would not be interested in a case involving Louisi-
ana law and a Louisiana court, limited liability company case law is still
relatively sparse, so looking to another state occasionally is warranted.
Delta Starr Broadcasting, L.L.C. was a Louisiana limited liability com-
pany (the "LLC") with three equal members.' 0 3 One member filed a vol-
untary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on behalf of the LLC, asserting
authority to do so based on gaining approval by two of the entity's three
members.1 04 The third member filed a motion to dismiss the petition, on
the basis that proper authorization had not been obtained, for two rea-
sons: (1) before the second member gave its apparent consent, it trans-
ferred its membership interest to a holding company controlled by the
third member (the objecting member); and (2), even if the second mem-
ber had still been a member when giving his purported consent, that ap-
proval was invalid because it was not given at a properly-convened
meeting of the members. The bankruptcy court agreed with the third
member on the second ground, that the action had not been approved at
a formal meeting of the members, and it dismissed the case for lack of
authority to file the petition. 10 5
The first member, the one who filed the bankruptcy petition, appealed
the ruling, arguing that the second member's sale of its interest did not
99. Id.
100. Id. The court of appeals indicated that the legislative intent was clear and that
under § 7.01(a), had Robert chosen to withdraw while living, the partnership would have
been required to buy him out. The court of appeals "[saw] no need to read the provisions
governing redemption so narrowly as to deny" Debbie the right to recover the redemption
price when the surviving partner utilized the partnership assets to continue the business
operation. Id. at 238.
101. Id. at 238. The parties fought about the valuation and whether life insurance poli-
cies were available to fund the buy-out, among other things not pertinent to this discussion.
Id. at 238-42.
102. In re Delta Starr Broad., L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4477 (E.D. La. Feb. 3,
2006).
103. Delta Starr, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4477, at *2.
104. In the opinion's description of the parties' arguments, there is no mention of either
party's pointing to an LLC agreement or a statute in support of the need for two of three
members to approve the action. But the district court did get to that, pointing to the de-
fault majority vote provision of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. section 12:1318(A) and (B). Id. at
*9-10.
105. Id. at *3.
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include a transfer of full membership or voting rights and that no formal
meeting was required to approve the filing.106 The federal district court
concluded that it must look to the law of the entity's state of organization,
Louisiana in this case, to determine the validity of the bankruptcy
petition.10 7
The district court first addressed whether the second member had vot-
ing rights on the day it consented to the bankruptcy filing.10 8 Louisiana
LLC law'0 9 provides that when a member assigns its membership inter-
est, the assignee may not exercise any membership rights until the as-
signee is properly admitted as a member.110 Additionally, absent
contrary agreement in governing documents of the LLC,"'1 an assignee of
a membership interest can become a substituted member only with writ-
ten unanimous consent of the members, and, until that time, the assignor
continues to be the member with the attendant rights (such as voting and
management)."l 2 The non-filing member argued that because he con-
trolled the assignee holding company and was already a member himself,
the assignee was not, in fact, a "new" member; therefore, he argued that
he was entitled to exercise all membership rights. The district court re-
jected that argument and held that the second member retained his vot-
ing rights because the assignee had not been duly admitted as a
member. 113 Therefore, he did not have the full attendant rights, including
voting."14
The district court then addressed whether, with the vote of two of the
three members in hand, the filing member had the authority to file for
bankruptcy on behalf of the LLC." 5 The district court found that Louisi-
ana law required that the filing of a bankruptcy petition be authorized by
106. Id. at *4.
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id. at *6.
109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301-1369 (2007).
110. § 12:1330. The same result is obtained under the Texas Limited Liability Company
Act, art. 1528n and art. 4.05(2).
111. As in the partnership arena, there typically is great flexibility to vary by contract a
result that would be obtained from application of the statute alone. It is sometimes said
that the role of the unincorporated business entity statutes is to "fill in the gaps" left by the
parties' agreement. The same result is obtained under the Texas Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, art. 2.09.A. and TRPA section 1.03.
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1332 (2007). For the same result, see Texas Limited
Liability Company Act, art. 4.05(4). Also, Texas Business Organizations Code ("TBOC"),
section 101.108(b)( 2)( A) does not allow an assignee of a membership interest to partici-
pate in the management and affairs of the LLC, which requires a vote of all members
(§ 101.109(b)).
113. Delta Starr, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4477, at *7-8.
114. Id. It is important to note that, absent something in the organization's constituent
documents, voting rights do not disappear on the assignment of a member's interest-they
either travel to the assignee or remain with the assignor. Though it may seem inconsistent
with the presumed intent of an assignor and assignee for the assignor to retain an impor-
tant right, such as voting, there are the other members to consider. And, in this situation,
the other member was required to approve the transfer of the voting rights and had not
done so. The agreement could have authorized a transferor to make its transferee a substi-
tute member.
115. Id. at *9-16.
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a majority of the members, unless the articles of organization or the oper-
ating agreement state otherwise. 1 6 So, the requirement was met. The
appeal therefore turned on whether Louisiana law requires business for-
malities, e.g., formal vote, resolution, meeting, etc., before members may
act on behalf of the LLC.117 The district court held that the legislature
intended to keep Louisiana's LLC law flexible and, for contrast, pointed
to the state's corporate law, which contains much stricter language requir-
ing various formalities. 118 The district court concluded that Louisiana
LLC law did not require that, to be effective, member approvals be given
at a meeting or in another formal manner, though the parties could have
stipulated that in their organization documents.11 9 The district court re-
versed the dismissal and remanded the case. 120
2. In re HSM Kennewick, L.P.121
This case is instructive on the nature of a LLC member's interest, con-
trasted with whether the member has an interest in property owned by
the LLC. The ninety-percent member ("Debtor") of a two-member
Washington state LLC (the "Company") filed for personal bankruptcy
because of lender pressure relating to Debtor's having pledged its mem-
bership interest to support Company indebtedness.
About ten weeks after the personal filing, Debtor filed a bankruptcy
petition on behalf of the Company, which the court dismissed for lack of
authority of the Debtor.122 On the next day, the ten-percent member
filed a state court receivership action against the Company. Debtor chal-
lenged that filing on the basis that it violated the bankruptcy automatic
stay,123 asserting that the receivership action affected Debtor's property
interest in the Company.1 24 The issue before the bankruptcy court, there-
fore, was whether the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code section 362 in
116. Id. at *10. Subdivision (A) is the basic default to majority, and subdivision (B) is
for "big deal" items like property transfers. Subdivision (B) requires a majority vote of
members even if there is a manager to otherwise run the show. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1318. The court equated a bankruptcy to a property transfer because all property
owned by the debtor is "transferred" to the bankruptcy estate. For a similar result under
Texas law, see Texas Limited Liability Company Act, Article 2.23.D (unless the constituent
documents provide otherwise, a vote of a majority is required to ... (3) authorize any act
that would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the LLC), and Article E
(unless the constituent documents provide otherwise, majority vote required to take any
action that is not apparently for carrying on the business of the limited liability company in
the usual way). Also, the new TBOC, in section 101.355, requires a majority vote unless
otherwise provided in the Code, which would include section 101.356(c).
117. Delta Starr, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4477, at *12.
118. Id. at *12-15.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *15.
121. 347 B.R. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
122. Id. at 57-71. The court did not elaborate on this ruling, saying only that the
Debtor "did not have the requisite corporate authority." Id. at 571. Presumably, the court
was using "corporate authority" in a more generic sense to mean authority to act for and
bind the entity (in this case, a limited liability company).
123. 11.U.S.C. § 362 (2007).
124. Kennewick, 347 B.R. at 571.
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the Debtor's bankruptcy case prohibited the second member from filing
the receivership action against the Company, which was not in
bankruptcy. 125
The knee-jerk reaction would be that the receivership was filed against
one not in bankruptcy, so the automatic stay does not come into play.
But the bankruptcy court went through a more complete analysis, begin-
ning with corporate law: a corporation and its shareholders are separate
entities, with title to corporate property vested in the corporation, not the
shareholders. 126 The bankruptcy court then discussed partnership law as
it related to LLCs, advising that Washington state courts apply partner-
ship law in determining the rights to assets of an LLC.12 7 Partners, simi-
lar to shareholders under corporate law, have no interest in the individual
assets of a partnership; instead, the interest represents that partner's
share in remaining funds after all debts are paid and accounts settled. 12 8
As the bankruptcy court noted, almost in passing, Washington's LLC Act
also states that an interest in an LLC is personal property and that a
member has no interest in any specific LLC property.129 Therefore,
Debtor had no direct interest in the assets of the Company, and the bank-
ruptcy court held that the other member's receivership action did not vio-
late the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. 130
125. Id.
126. Id. at 571.
127. Id. LLCs are new and it is common for courts and others to consult partnership
common law for guidance when unable to find it directly. Such consultation seemed un-
necessary here. The cases cited by the court make it clear that the Washington courts seek
that partnership law guidance when they cannot find it in the limited liability company law.
See BP Land & Cattle, LLC v. Balcom & Moe, Inc., 86 P.3d 788, 790 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004); Koh v. Inno-Pacific Holdings, Ltd., 54 P.3d 1270-72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
128. Kennewick, 347 B.R. at 572.
129. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.245(1) (West 2006). It seems odd that the
bankruptcy court would feel the need to look to corporation or partnership law on this
issue, given the direct coverage by the LLC statute. Perhaps it was merely buttressing the
statute with common law that would have been consulted in the absence of statutory
coverage.
130. Kennewick, 347 B.R. at 572. Citing the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history, the
bankruptcy court noted that the policy of the automatic stay is "to prevent dismemberment
of the estate and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor's assets." Id. at 572 (quot-
ing the Bankruptcy Code legislative history, H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 341
(1977)). The bankruptcy court found no such dismemberment or any interference with the
reorganization proceeding. Id. at 572. Interestingly, the member who filed the receiver-
ship apparently conceded that the receivership could adversely affect the Debtor, but ar-
gued "that the automatic stay does not extend far enough to protect a member in a limited
liability company from an action that would adversely affect the value of the member's
interest." Id. at 571. The court agreed. Id. at 572. Without knowing what the receivership
asked for, one might have speculated that the receivership might even benefit the LLC
and, therefore, the members and their interests as well as the estate of the Debtor. Appar-
ently, from the other member's mouth, that was not the likely result here.
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